Messay Kebede
A central inspiration of this article is Meskerem Abera’s paper titled “የአማራ ብሔርተኝነት እና የሀገረ-ኢትዮጵያ መስተጋብር,” which can be loosely translated as “Amhara Nationalism and its Interaction with Ethiopianness.” Investigating the concept of what Meskerem calls “the new Amhara nationalism” (“አዲሱ የአማራ ብሄርተኝነት”), my paper examines its features, notably by contrasting it with the older version of Amhara nationalism. To give a full picture of the contrast, it brings into play the game-changing role of Fano in promoting a renovated assertive nationalist ideology. It also carefully inspects its interactions with Ethiopianness in relation to the question of knowing whether the new nationalism opens a more promising avenue to a negotiated settlement ensuring the survival of Ethiopia as a peaceful and democratic country.
Prioritizing Amharaness
Many of us remember the time when there was a debate over the existence or nonexistence of a delineated ethnic group known as the Amhara people, a debate largely fueled by the fact that “for a long time, the Amhara have identified as Ethiopians.”Today, not only the debate has come to an end, but also a grassroots and impressive armed movement known as Fano openly and vigorously claims to fight for the survival and interests of the Amhara people. Together with the claim, studies abound that define and set apart the Amhara ethnic group by the possession of features, like a common ancestry and history, a shared language and culture, as well as a similar psychological makeup.
The genesis of a sharp distinction between the Amhara group and other ethnic groups progressively stemmed from the sociopolitical changes that had shaken Ethiopia since the fall of the late emperor. Previously, most Amharas, in addition to defining themselves as Ethiopians, identified themselves by the sub-regions from which they came, like Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo, or Shoa. As pointed out by Yared citing David Levine, “the Amhara shy away from identifying with a strong sense of belonging to the Amhara community. Instead, ‘they identify themselves either on a regional (provincial) basis, Gojjamie versus Gondere—or else by means of the supra-ethnic term Habesha’.”
Inherent in the sociopolitical changes was the growing accusation that Emperor Menelik’s violent southward expansion resulted in the creation of an empire in which conquered non-Amhara groups were placed under harsh hegemonic rule. In consequence, these groups were not only economically dominated and exploited, but they were also denied the right to use their own language and practice their culture. The extreme version of the accusation goes to the extent of defining the Amharas as colonizers and the dominated groups as colonized.
The accusation did more than demarcate the Amhara group from other groups: it increasingly exposed them to attacks. Indeed, following successive sociopolitical changes, in addition to losing their dominant position, Amhara elites became the target of both verbal and physical attacks in various places in the country. These attacks expanded and intensified under the political reshuffle that crowed Abiy Ahmed as prime minister and ushered in the preponderant position of Oromo elites in the government and other positions of power.
The reactions of Amhara elites and people to these attacks, which were clearly inspired by a revengeful stand, completed the demarcation process in that it gave it an internal, subjective dimension. In other words, the fact of being victims of attacks compelled the Amharas to fully come to terms with their distinctness and defend it with vigor. The combination of the external side with a subjective side allows the definition of Amharaness as a construct, that is, as a reaction to the persecutions, displacements, mistreatments, and anti-Amhara narratives, first orchestrated by the TPLF and then picked up and amplified by the Oromo elites and other ethnic groups.
It is necessary that we insist on the encounter between the external and internal sides to understand the impact of the Fano insurgency. To the accusation of the Amharas as being exploiters and suppressors, the response of many of them has been that the Amhara elite did it in alliance with elites from other ethnic groups. As a multiethnic rule, the domination had more of a class character than the ascendancy of one ethnic group. As such, it related exploiters and exploited under the common attribute of being all Ethiopians. However, since the argument did nothing to stop the attacks, the sense of being singled out and victimized as Amhara increasingly became part of the Amhara identity. This sense of collective victimhood nurtured, in turn, the need for a fervent claim of and a firm identification with Amharaness, which is a classical manner of defying the ongoing demonization. This way of claiming a victimized identity naturally prioritizes ethnic belonging over Ethiopianness and induces the resolution to stand up for one’s vilified ethnic group. The evolution from a loose attachment to Amharaness and a strong commitment to Ethiopianness to a combative and proud identification with Amharaness assumed a full-blown presence with the entrance of Fano fighters into the scene of Ethiopian politics.
To size up what is at stake in the downplaying of Ethiopianness in favor of Amharaness, one must recall how damaging was and still is the previous Amhara claim to be first and for most Ethiopians. From the perspective of the dominated groups, this Amhara claim meant that Ethiopia is nothing but an extension of the Amhara identity, even if misleadingly it is alleged that Ethiopia signifies an identity transcending all ethnic groups. Thus, while the government is more focused on criminalizing Fano and the new Amhara nationalism by portraying Fano fighters “as extremists, looters, criminals, bandits, undisciplined groups, and other related characterizations,” extremist activists are more inclined to denounce a movement with a clear political agenda. According to an extremist Oromo activist, “Ethiopianism is the predominant form of Amhara nationalism in Ethiopia. … The primary goal of Fanno has been and still is, like fascist Amhara feudal rulers of the past, to create one country, one flag, one Amharic language, one Amhara culture, one psychological makeup Amhara view, and one Christian orthodox religion-Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.” For another Tigrayan extremist, Fano’s “plan A has been to materialize their ambition to reinstate a unitary government system and put Ethiopia under their centralized power control.” In short, the Amhara claim is misleading because, as the dominant group, the Amharas have shaped Ethiopia in their own image. Accordingly, in the eyes of dominated groups, the contention of being primarily Ethiopians implies that Ethiopia as a transcending identity is yet to come into existence. This, in turn, means that Ethiopia must be deconstructed and replaced by an identity reflecting all ethnic groups. This last implication constitutes a red line for many Amharas, a line that Meskerem and some Fano leaders have crossed, nonetheless.
Genesis of the new Amhara Nationalism
In approaching the new nationalism as a reactive construct to threats, this paper falls in line with the method adopted by most scholars, which is to attribute two kinds of causes to the rise of the new Amhara nationalism. The one has to do with structural issues and the other with immediate or precipitating factors.
Before delving into the causes, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that most Amharas, opposed as they are to ethnic politicization because of its divisiveness and threat to the oneness of the country, naturally adhered to their previous stand of being primarily Ethiopians during their opposition to the TPLF-led ethnic federalism. They resolved to challenge ethnic federalism in the name of the transcending common identity that unites all Ethiopians regardless of their ethnic belongings, namely, Ethiopianness. They argued that federalism based on citizenship or geographical demarcations would be more appropriate to consolidate the shared identity while ensuring some measure of regional autonomy.
Nothing attests better to the stubborn commitment of Amharas to Ethiopianness than the fate of the All-Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO). Founded by Prof. Asrat Woldeyes in 1993 to specifically represent and fight for Amhara interests, the organization dropped its ethnic label in 2002 to become the All-Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP). According to Meskerem, the change, which brought about the demise of the organization, was “a glaring mistake” (my translation). Clearly, for the Amharas to both give primacy to Amhara nationalism and take up arms to defend it, the intensity and extension of the threats under Abiy must have, in their eyes, crossed the threshold of the intolerable.
Structural Causes
As most Amharas see it, the core issue from which all the flows derive is the structure of federalism based on ethnic units promoted to the rank of nations and nationalities. In addition to being imposed by the TPLF, the federal system is deliberately established to prioritize ethnic identity over national unity, the primacy going to the extent of granting ethnic groups the absolute right to secede if they so wish. While federalism is normally used to dilute the divisiveness of ethnicity and boost national unity, all the rules and constitutional provisions in Ethiopia tend to strengthen ethnic identity to the detriment of a unifying national identity. In light of this embedded divisiveness, it is no wonder that Ethiopia is fraught with continuous ethnic conflicts and their consequences, like displacements and violent attacks. In particular, since the promotion of ethnicity was from the start designed to challenge and counter the Amhara hegemony over the country, the fact that Amharas have been by far the most singled out and the most mistreated and attacked confirms that ethnic federalism is indeed the root cause of all the issues.
In connection with ethnic federalism, one structural issue that stands out is “the inadequacy of the Ethiopian constitution in safeguarding minority rights. … This reality is strikingly evident in Oromia, home to approximately 10 to 15 million Amharas.” The lack of protection of minorities has particularly exposed the Amharas living in Oromia and other ethnic regions to numerous violations of their rights, such as expropriations, displacements, mass killings, without the federal government taking any measure to stop any of them. Persecutions of the followers of Orthodox Christianity in Oromia and other regions were also part of the ethnic-based regional mistreatments. Even more serious was the lack of adequate representations in the Amhara region itself, since, in the mind of most Amharas, they were ruled by “surrogates appointed” first by the TPLF and then by the Prosperity Party (PP). The systematic recourse to this kind of appointment entailed that “self-rule (a fundamental right) has been consistently withheld from them [the Amharas].”
Among the structural reasons, the forceful annexation of “Amhara-inhabited and agriculturally fertile areas, including Welkaiyt and Raya,” figures prominently in the list of Amhara grievances against the existing political arrangements. The numerous protests and peaceful attempts to recover the areas have all fallen on deaf ears, more so now than before given the hostility of the ruling clique towards the Amharas. For the latter, all the mentioned infringements signified a deliberate policy to target and weaken them, the ultimate purpose of which is to permanently incapacitate and subdue them.
No less crucial in nourishing and intensifying the Amhara nationalist reaction were the negative and disparaging narratives that accompanied and, in many ways, justified ethnic federalism. Among the disparaging identifications, we find such tags as colonizers, expansionists, neftegnas, extremists, and alien settlers. The narratives stirred up and intensified suspicion and hatred among the other ethnic groups with the unavoidable consequence of exposing the Amharas to all sorts of mistreatments and violent attacks. Insisting on the incendiary impact of the narratives, especially in Oromia where the narratives have become an integral part of the official indoctrination of Oromo people, Yonas Biru justly writes: “For 50 years, extremist Oromo intellectuals polarized the Oromo youth, hardening it with rage and hate against the Amhara, and turning it into an institution of violence and terror.” The question of the accuracy of the narratives is never raised; nor is the option to let bygones be bygones considered, even though it would have been the wiser course, now that ethnic federalism has laid the ground for the cessation of ethnic inequality. The truth is that the question of accuracy is overtaken by the mobilizing impact that the narratives have on other ethnic groups. To gather support in the ongoing conflicts over the control of power, ethnicized elites highly value the impact of narratives vilifying their adversaries.
Precipitating Factors
All these mistreatments and violent actions would not have gone beyond silent grievances and, maybe at times, peaceful protests, were it not for the flood of precipitating factors unleashed by Prime Minister Abiy’s reckless policy.
Among the precipitating factors, the most consequential was without doubt the government’s decision to call upon, train, and arm Amhara militia and youth to counter and defeat the attacks of the TPLF’s militia forces against the Ethiopian armed forces with the clear intent of marching on Addis Ababa. The decision was consequential because it provided the Amhara grievances with much-needed armed backing. What is even more consequential was the government’s decision to disarm and disband the Amhara militia and numerous volunteers soon after the military defeat of the TPLF. Signed on November 2, 2022, the Pretoria peace agreement between the government and the TPLF added fuel to the fire: not only the demands and concerns of the Amharas were not addressed in the agreement, but also the provision that specifically dictated the disarming of the TPLF forces was ignored.
The decision to disarm the Amhara militia, even as the safety of the Amhara region was far from being assured, rightfully appeared to most Amhara as an unfair and dangerous fallout. One thing is certain: Abiy opted for this reckless decision because he thought that his army would not encounter any meaningful resistance. In thus overestimating the capacity of his army and underestimating the anger and the fighting resolution of the Amharas, he heedlessly unleashed a formidable force that increasingly appeared ready and capable of ending his regime.
All the more reason to resent the unfairness of the government towards the Amhara people was the added decision prohibiting entrance to Addis Ababa to travelers from the Amhara region. The ruling could not but enhance the sense of being the target of a discriminative policy. Equally discriminative was the denial of fertilizers to Amhara farmers, who, to no avail, openly protested on several occasions.
Pan-Ethiopianness and Amhara Nationalism
Now that Amhara nationalism has achieved a full-blown reality thanks to the rise and consolidation of Fano, the crucial issue that comes to the forefront is the question of knowing the kind of relationship it has with pan-Ethiopianness. In this regard, most commentators see no incompatibility between the two nationalisms and readily assign a dual objective to Fanon. For instance, Yonas Biru maintains that Fano has the “dual objective of protecting Amhara from existential threat and bringing about a transformative national democratic governance.”
The striking thing is that those who attribute to Fano the dual objective of ensuring the safety of the Amharas and transforming Ethiopia argue that the only way to do so is to dismantle ethnic federalism. In their view, since ethnic-based federalism is the very reason why the safety of Amharas is in danger, abolishing it is the first logical step. There is one exception, though: Yonas Biru, who, to my knowledge, never advocated such a measure. He even goes explicitly against it when he criticizes the slogan used by one of the previous leaders of the Amhara nationalist movement, Shaleka Dawit. According to him, Shaleka’s slogan, “‘መነሻችን አማራ መድረሻችን ኢትዮጵያ” [Our starting point is Amhara, and our destination is Ethiopia],” is unacceptable because “we cannot fight for Amhara edition of Ethiopia while fighting Oromummaa edition of Ethiopia.” Once ethnic diversity has become a founding principle of the federal system, there is no going back to the previous “Amhara” version of Ethiopia.
Consider the case of Dr. Mengistu Musie: after assigning a double objective to Fano, he writes: “The existing political system, with its ethnic biases and exclusions, has fostered an environment where the Amara people feel incessantly under threat. Therefore, the push for radical change is not merely an ideological pursuit but a necessary step towards ensuring the survival and prosperity of the Amara people.” He adds” “radical change” means first and foremost “dissolving and rewriting the constitution to prohibit ethnic-based political systems.” In the same vein, Badege Bishaw and Aklog Birara defend the idea of dual goal: “Currently,” they write, “Amhara is fighting for sheer survival first, and second, for equitable and fair treatment, justice, inclusive, and democratic governance,” which primarily entails “the abolishment of the current Ethiopian ethnic based constitution and . . . the termination of the ethnic federal structure.”
Now, let us suppose that Fano achieves its dual objective, what will become of Amhara nationalism? Will it dissolve into Ethiopianness and its attendant promotion of citizenship? To say yes is to acknowledge that Amharaness was just a tactical means to mobilize the Amhara people for the sole purpose of eliminating ethnic federalism. It is also to impose Fano’s vision of Ethiopia on other ethnic groups, which amounts to fashioning Ethiopia in the Amhara image. The aim completely ignores the possibility that other ethnic groups may not want to dismantle ethnic federalism, a possibility that no one can discard. Should the Amharas then secede from the federation because they do not have their way?
In whichever way one examines the notion of dual objective, its internal incompatibility jumps out. Either one opts for nationalism and behaves as a nation that is respectful of self-rule for itself and for other ethnic nations, with the understanding that it will enter into agreements and union with them only as a sovereign group, or one goes for Ethiopianness and, in this case, one gives up sovereignty to become an integral part of the larger union. Historically, the second alternative, which is the most common, has been realized using conquests and the help of supra-ethnic systems of values, like Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and more recently of the short-lived class ideology of Marxism-Leninism, in most places in the world. Much less frequent is the first alternative: it is the path taken by such countries as Switzerland, Canada, and India, in which large regional autonomy designed to work in harmony with a form of unity acting as an umbrella has been instituted and respected as an inviolable democratic right.
Incidentally, both Ethiopianness and the Derg’s slogan, Ethiopia Tikdem, were attempts to transition from conquest to a union based on shared values transcending ethnic and religious differences. They both failed because of internal contradictions due to the lack of a democratic approach. The failure brought about the need to implement the first alternative through the project of ethnic federalism. The attempt proved unsuccessful in practice because various means favoring strong centralization were used to undermine the promised regional autonomy. In other words, in the successive changes that Ethiopia went through in the name of equality and freedom, failures were unavoidable because of the lack and deliberate obstruction of democratic procedures. I say unavoidable because both equality and freedom are, by definition, refractory to the use of dictatorial methods. Under Abiy’s government, the same failure is observed but on a larger scale, as testified by massive displacements and killings in Oromia and other places as well as by intimidations and extensive arbitrary imprisonments of Amhara leaders, activists, and journalists. It is because the implemented ethnic federalism turned its back on democracy that Amhara nationalism took root and reached the scale it has today.
Seeing the entrenched undemocratic direction of ethnic federalism, Amhara elites and people should have, from the start, moved their thinking towards the adoption of a nationalist platform. Still, let there be no misunderstanding: as Mekerem explains, the mistake that Amharas prioritizing Ethiopianness committed is not that they stood and fought for the continuation of Ethiopia, but because they were unable to maintain a balanced relationship between the two nationalisms (“በሁለቱ ብሄርተኝነቶች መካከል ሊኖር የሚገባዉን ጤናማ ሚዛናዊነት ለማስጠበቅ አለመሞከሩ ግን ዉድ ዋጋ ያስከፈለ ስህተት ነዉ፡፡”). Given that ethnic criteria decide the rules of the political game, prioritizing Ethiopianness prevented the defense of Amhara identity and interests at a time when the right move should have been to detach Amharaness from Ethiopian nationalism and build a strong Amhara nationalism, thereby highlighting the looming dangers and designing the appropriate solutions(“የአማራ ብሄርተኝነትን ከኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኝነት ነጥሎ በማዉጣት የአማራን ህዝብ አንገብጋቢ የህልዉና ጥያቄዎችን ጥርት ባለ መንገድ ግልፅ ማድረግና ለጥያቄዎቹ መልስ ለማግኘት የሚያስችል ጠንከር ያለ የአማራ ብሄርተኝነት ትግል ማድረግ ነዉ፡፡). In thus refusing to rely on a strong Amhara nationalism, Amhara elites have put themselves out of the political game.
Objections to the New Amhara Nationalism
As could be expected, Meskerem’s defense of a strong Amhara nationalism could not but raise objections from the Amhara and other ethnic groups’ elites and politicians. My presentation of the objections will particularly focus on Tesfaye Demmellash’s article titled “The Amhara Existential Struggle Against Tribal Tyranny: Thoughts for Strategy and Action.” Directly referring to Meskerem and Abebe Belew, Tesfaye writes, “Both dissenters agree that Itiopiawinnet cannot help Amharas effectively resist the hostile acts and genocidal attacks of the ruling ‘Oromia’ outfit and its surrogates.” Tesfaye insists that he perfectly understands and supports the present Amhara struggle for survival. However, he has a hard time endorsing the adoption of a nationalist ideology because such a direction is detrimental to both Ethiopia and the Amhara people.
To begin with, the adoption of a nationalist banner betrays “the continued dominance of the Stalinist structural model of ethnic politics over Ethiopian national affairs after the fall of the TPLF from power.” Since the model has convincingly shown its detrimental effects, to continue on the same mistaken road is just to perpetuate and exasperate the existing problems. Moreover, the adoption of ethnic nationalism is for the Amhara confusing and contradictory for the simple reason that Ethiopianness is embedded in the Amhara identity. This is so true that the Amharas cannot define themselves independently of Ethiopia. As Tesfaye puts it, “‘Amhara’ and ‘Ethiopia’ should not be construed as a duality, signifying categorical separation or difference; they are mutually constitutive and reinforcing.” In this condition, any attempt to define the one without the other is confusing because no Amhara can recognize himself/herself if one of the two is left out, let alone the two construed as opposites.
One consequence of prioritizing Amharaness over Ethiopianness is that it is not “a movement of thought toward producing systemic dissent from the ethnic-centered political status quo.” How would the Amharas continue to oppose ethnic federalism if they themselves transform their ethnic identity into a nationalist commitment? Worse yet, the transformation disadvantages them because, in taking the nationalist direction, they leave the cause of Ethiopia to Abiy, who then would have the easy game of characterizing the adopted path “chauvinistic” and unconcerned about the Ethiopian whole.” In thus emerging as the true and dedicated defender of Ethiopian unity, he will take away from the Amharas the ability to find allies outside the Amhara region. “Without a national ideology,” writes Tesfaye, “Amhara cannot appeal to the larger Ethiopia.”
Even the unnecessity of a nationalist platform springs to mind from the simple fact that the Amharas are not driven by “tribal hatred and resentment of others.” In being free of these sentiments, they have no need to barricade themselves behind ethnic walls, still less to attack other peoples. On the contrary, they have the proper disposition to mix with other groups and rebuild the Ethiopian nation. This openness confirms “Amhara’s distinctness,” namely, the duality of being itself but also open to others, that is, of being Ethiopian. What this means is that Amhara identity is refractory to the sectarian, isolationist ideology of ethnicity. Without Ethiopianness, Amhara identity suffocates, divested as it is of one part of itself. Stated otherwise, Ethiopia is not an extension of the Amhara identity. Instead, it is its playing field, the field necessary for its expression and without which it cannot be itself or accomplish its essence. Far from seeking closeness, Amharaness needs diversity to flourish. Amhara nationalists, while they are right in calling for self-defense, miss the point that, in closing on itself, Amharaness distorts itself. Commitment to Amharaness without a national ideology that unites diverse peoples is just betrayal.
In Defense of Meskerem
No doubt, Tesfaye’s ideas are seductive; they even release some echo of the past prior to the institutionalization of ethnic politics. Even so, their seductiveness does not prevent the surfacing of many objections. Let us leave aside the objection according to which, under the disguise of openness, Tesfaye does no more than embellish and distort the true features of the Amhara mentality, to wit, expansionism and domination. We should leave it aside for the reason that it can only lead to back-and-forth rejoinders that go nowhere. Instead, basing ourselves on the already cited text of Meskerem, let us focus on what she would say against Tesfaye’s position.
First, to avoid any misunderstanding, I hurry to repeat that Meskerem is in no way questioning the close relationship tying Amharaness with Ethiopianness. Like Tesfaye, she maintains that Ethiopianness is part of Amhara identity; renouncing it would be self-inflicted psychological damage. In fact, so close a tie between the two identities turns Ethiopianness into an internal need for self-expression of Amharaness. Second, the fate of the Amhara is not confined to the Amhara region: it extends to the other regions, given that millions of Amharas, who also need protection, are scattered all over Ethiopia. (“የመጀመሪያዉ የአማራ ህዝብ በኢትዮጵያ ሃገረ-መንግስት ስሪት ዉስጥ የማይተካ ሚና ያለዉና የፖለቲካ ስነልቦናዉም ከኢትዮጵያ ሃገረ-መንግስት ጋር በጥብቅ የተቆራኘ በመሆኑ ነዉ፡፡ ሁለተኛዉ በሚሊየኖች የሚቆጠሩ የአማራ ተወላጆች በመላዉ ኢትዮጵያ ተበትነዉ የሚኖሩ በመሆናቸዉ ነዉ፡፡) (ስለሆነም አዲሱ የአማራ ብሄርተኝነት የኢትዮጵያ ሃገረ መንግስትን መቀጠል በእጅጉ የሚፈልገዉ ነገር ነዉ”፡፡) Consequently, the mistake that many Amharas commit is not that they claim both identities, but that they prioritize the one at the expense of the other, thereby failing to strike the right balance between the two.
Another mistake is the largely accepted belief that if the Amhara organize themselves as an ethnic group, it will be the end of Ethiopia. Shared by many Amharas as well as by many individuals from other ethnic groups, the belief has the strange connotation that, unlike all other groups, the Amharas do not have the right to organize themselves ethnically, even to protect themselves, because they are the only guardians of Ethiopia. The sub-implication of this exclusive guardianship is that Ethiopia survives or cannot survive without the Amharas. (ሃገራችን በብሄር ፖለቲካ ምክንያት የተጋረጠባትን የመፍረስ አደጋ ለማስቀረት አማራዉ በብሄር መደራጀት የለበትም፤ አማራዉ በብሄር መደራጀት ከጀመረ ሃገሪቷ መፍረሷ ነዉ የሚለዉ ነዉ፡፡ የዚህ እሳቤ ሌላዉ ገፅ ኢትዮጵያ የቆመችዉ ወይም ልትቆም የሚገባት በአማራ ትከሻ ላይ ብቻ ነዉ የሚል ከእዉነታ የተፋታ አመክንዮ ነዉ፡፡) For Meskerem, the belief is not only mistaken but it is also dangerous. It allows anti-Amhara groups to amalgamate the two identities to attack the Amharas. To turn Ethiopia into an exclusively Amhara concern is exactly to underline that its survival and continuance are not a concern shared by all ethnic groups. It also gives the Amharas a false sense of security in that they think that being Ethiopian provides protection when in reality it exposes them to attacks.
When all is said and done, the momentous mistake of those who prioritize Ethiopianness is their ignorance or underestimation of the magnitude of changes that have taken place since the establishment of ethnic federalism. Because of this grave omission, they fail to offer what Amharas need to protect themselves and their interests. In its place, they recommend using Ethiopianness, to which unfortunately nothing tangible or practical corresponds. Nowhere in the constitution and related references is there a stipulation attaching a single right to being Ethiopian. People are defined by their ethnic group, with their rights and duties flowing from their ethnic membership. In the existing constitution, the term “Ethiopia” signifies either a territory, a generalization or represents the federal government. Whatever right is associated with being Ethiopian, not only does it derive from ethnic membership but also it is enforceable only through the ethnic system. That is why minority ethnic groups living outside their own territories are unprotected: they are viewed as aliens and their claim to be Ethiopians, far from protecting them, puts them in danger.
Because Ethiopianness signifies nothing in terms of rights, any organization or political party that carries the designation of “Ethiopian” is ipso facto operating in a vacuum, deprived as it is of any connection with the existing reality. For Meskerem, this is what happened to the AAPO when it dropped the designation of AEUP: it lost touch with reality and became unable to insert itself into the political struggle. In deserting its ethnic base AEUP represented nothing; worse, it abandoned its original purpose to fight for the Amhara people. In this way, it could neither defend Amhara interests nor the continuity of Ethiopia, for to do so an ethnic-based party is a prerequisite. (“መአድ ያለጊዜዉ ወደ መኢአድነት ሲቀየር የሰራዉ ስህተት የወቅቱን የፖለቲካ መግባቢያ ቋንቋ ይዞ ሲጓዝበት የነበረዉን ተገቢ አካሄድ ትቶ ህገ-መንግስታዊም መሰረትም ሆነ የወቅቱ የፖለቲካ መግባቢያ ቋንቋ በሌለዉ የትግል ዘይቤ ለመሄድ መምረጡ ነዉ፡፡”).
Let us therefore acknowledge two things. 1) The only way to defend both the Amharas and Ethiopia passes through the assumption of Amharaness, which anchors you to the existing political reality; 2) the label of Ethiopianness does no more than bring the charge of chauvinism and arrogance because conflating Amharaness with Ethiopianness gives the distinct impression that Amhara elites are imposing their ethnic identity on other identities in the name of Ethiopia. (“ወደ ኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኝነት የሚደረግ ጉዞ በትምክህተኝነት የሚያስፈርጅ፣ የራስን ብሄር ፍላጎት በኢትዮጵያ ስም በሌሎች ላይ በመጫን የኢትዮጵያዊነት ሰርተፊኬት ለመስጠት የመሞከር እብሪተኝነት ሲያስወርፍ የኖረ “ስሁት” አካሄድ ነዉ፡፡”) Fusing the two identities utterly invites ethnonationalists to say that Ethiopianness is nothing more than a disguise of Amhara nationalism. (“ብሄርተኝነትን የአማራ ብሄርተኝነት መደበቂያ ዋሻ”). The thinking entails the consequence that non-Amharas become understandably no or little eager to come out in defense of Ethiopia, that is, of an identity in which they did not partake. (“የኢትዮጵያ ብሄር ብሄረሰቦች በየብሄራቸዉ ጎራ ገብተዉ ስለ ብሄራቸዉ መብት መከበር ብቻ ሲሰሩ የኢትዮጵያን ሃገረ-መንግስት የማስቀጠሉ እዳ በአማራ ህዝብ ጫንቃ ላይ ብቻ የወደቀ እንዲሆን አድርጓል፡፡”)
By way of Conclusion
What might we conclude from this analysis of the new Amhara nationalism? Obviously, the new nationalism, unlike the position conflating Ethiopianness with Amharaness, does not seek the termination of ethnic federalism. True, it acknowledges all the shortcomings of the system, but it is also ready to work with other ethnic groups to reform it and ensure that all ethnic groups, including first and foremost the Amharas, are protected and their rights respected. (ይህ ትግል ከኢትዮጵያ ሀገረ-መንግስት ጋር ጠብ ሊኖረዉ ቀርቶ የሚታገለዉ ሀገረ-ኢትዮጵያ የአማራን እና የሌሎች ወንድም እህት ህዝቦችን መብት አክብራ በጥንካሬ እንድትጓዝ ነዉ፡፡). This means that its positions and fights do not occur in the abstract; they all take place in real Ethiopia and aim to bring changes that protect the interests of Amharas and those of each ethnic group. Far from excluding ethnic groups and ethnic parties, it calls for collaboration in the realization of mutual interests.
It is safe to say that the avoidance of a “dual objective” defines the new nationalism. In focusing primarily on the defense of Amhara interests, it takes the necessary time to organize itself and mobilize popular support. At this first stage, its focus is not on Ethiopia, except on the places where Amharas live in great numbers, like Addis Ababa and Wollega. The implementation of the first stage enables the passage to a next stage, that is, to Ethiopia and its future. It is basically the stage where discussions with representatives of other ethnic groups take place: it is the stage that involves proposals and concessions to come to a mutual agreement on how Ethiopia should be governed to the satisfaction of all concerned groups. Meskerem: (“ስለሆነም አዲሱ የአማራ ብሄርተኝነት መነሻዉን በአማራ ህዝብ ጥያቄዎችና በደሎች ላይ አድርጎ፣ በዛዉ ላይ በቂ ጊዜ ወስዶ ቆይቶ ዉስጠ ብሄር የቤት ስራዉን በስኬታማ መንገድ ፈፅሞ መዳረሻዉን ከሌሎች የኢትዮጵያ ብሄረሰቦች ጋር በመመካከር የፀናች የኢትዮጵያ ሃገረ መንግስትን እዉን በማድረግ ላይ ያደርጋል፡፡”)
Here a parenthesis is in order. In an interview with EMS, Asres Mare, the spokesperson of Fano (Gojjam), openly rejects the battle cry “our departure is Amhara, our arrival Ethiopia.” He maintains that his organization has never embraced such a motto. Doubling down on his rejection, Asres even says that the Amhara region is both our point of departure and arrival. Amharas must have the full right of self-administration, and this includes places like Addis Ababa and Wollega. Once the Amhara region is fully liberated, his organization will move to the following stage, namely, the rest of Ethiopia. In this stage, Fano will consult and work with representatives of all the other ethnic groups to generate a government reflecting the concerns of all groups.
As one can see, there is a remarkable coincidence between Meskerem’s vision of the new Amhara nationalism and that of Asres. In both cases, the prioritization of the survival and interests of the Amharas, henceforth considered not just as a means but as a goal as well, is the main objective. Only once this goal is reached and the Amhara people find their true representatives can discussions with other ethnic leaders about the future of Ethiopia begin. To be sure, the discussions will involve mutual concessions, but with the understanding that its outcomes must be in accordance with the interests of the Amhara people, and this includes their status accruing from their importance in the Ethiopian alignment of political forces. In this way, the main criticism of the ethnonationalists according to which Ethiopia is nothing but a coverup for Amhara nationalism is put to rest in favor of an Ethiopia that is open to the contributions of all ethnic groups.
